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Jurisdiction 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3G). 
Issues Presented for Review 
1. Did the trial court correctly apply Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14(2) in 
determining that it lacked jurisdiction given Plaintiffs failure to exhaust 
administrative remedies? The trial court's jurisdiction presents a question of law, 
which this Court reviews for correctness. See, e.g.. National Advertising Co. v. 
Murray City Corp.. 2006 UT App 75,1f11, 131 P.3d 872. 
2. Alternatively, did the trial court correctly apply the doctrine of laches 
in granting summary judgment in favor of Defendant? The trial court's 
application of the doctrine of laches is a question of fact which this Court reviews 
for abuse of discretion. See, e.g.. Papanikolas Bros. Enterprises v. Sugar House 
Shopping Center Associates. 535 P.2d 1256, 1260 (Utah 1975). 
Both issues were originally raised in Wilkinson's Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment filed with the trial court on December 1, 2005. (R. at 186-
215.) 
Determinative Statutory Provisions 
Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-128 
(1) Anyone may apply to the division for a certificate of existence for a domestic 
corporation, a certificate of authorization for a foreign corporation, or a certificate 
that sets forth any facts of record in the office of the division. 
(2) A certificate of existence or authorization sets forth: 
(a) the domestic corporation's corporate name or the foreign corporation's 
corporate name registered in this state; 
(b) that: 
(i) the domestic corporation is duly incorporated under the law of this state and 
the date of its incorporation; or 
(ii) the foreign corporation is authorized to transact business in this state; 
(c) that all fees, taxes, and penalties owed to this state have been paid, if: 
(i) payment is reflected in the records of the division; and 
(ii) nonpayment affects the existence or authorization of the domestic or foreign 
corporation; 
(d) that its most recent annual report required by Section 16-10a-1607 has been 
filed by the division; 
(e) that articles of dissolution have not been filed; and 
(f) other facts of record in the office of the division that may be requested by the 
applicant. 
(3) Subject to any qualification stated in the certificate, a certificate issued by the 
division may be relied upon as conclusive evidence of the facts set forth in the 
certificate. 
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14 
(1) A party aggrieved may obtain judicial review of final agency action, except in 
actions where judicial review is expressly prohibited by statute. 
(2) A party may seek judicial review only after exhausting all administrative 
remedies available, except that: 
(a) a party seeking judicial review need not exhaust administrative remedies if 
this chapter or any other statute states that exhaustion is not required; 
(b) the court may relieve a party seeking judicial review of the requirement to 
exhaust any or all administrative remedies if: 
2 
(i) the administrative remedies are inadequate; or 
(ii) exhaustion of remedies would result in irreparable harm disproportionate to 
the public benefit derived from requiring exhaustion. 
(3)(a) A party shall file a petition for judicial review of final agency action within 
30 days after the date that the order constituting the final agency action is 
issued or is considered to have been issued under Subsection 63-46b-13 (3)(b). 
(b) The petition shall name the agency and all other appropriate parties as 
respondents and shall meet the form requirements specified in this chapter. 
Nature of the Case 
This case is an appeal from the district court's grant of summary judgment 
in favor of Defendant Wilkinson Farm Services Company, ("Wilkinson.") The 
district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction in this matter, or that 
in the alternative, Plaintiffs claims are barred under the doctrine of laches. 
Course of Proceedings 
Plaintiff filed its Complaint in this matter on August 25, 2003. (R. at 001-
003.) The Division of Corporations of the Utah Department of Commerce, ("the 
Division,") was later joined and dismissed as a party to the action. (R. at 029-
32, 107-112.) A subsequent Third Party Complaint was filed against the 
Division, which the trial court dismissed. (R. at 113-18, 165-67.) On November 
10, 2005, Plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment. (R. at 168-185.) On 
December 1, 2005, Defendant filed a cross motion for summary judgment. (R. 
at 186-215.) Following oral arguments on the matter, the district court granted 
Defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied the Plaintiffs motion for 
summary judgment. (R. at 244-46.) Plaintiff timely appealed therefrom. (R. at 
247-48.) 
Statement of Facts1 
On November 18,1927, Wilkinson, originally known as Wilkinson-Shupe 
Implement Company was formed by the execution of Articles of Incorporation. 
(R. at 198-204.) Under Article IV of those articles, Wilkinson's corporate 
duration was set at 50 years. (R. at 198.) Nevertheless, Wilkinson never 
ceased to do business when its duration expired. Wilkinson continued to file 
annual reports with the Division, which were accepted. (R. at 185.) 
S.C. Wilkinson was an original incorporator of Wilkinson in 1927 and 
served as its president from its inception. (R. at 207.) Beginning in 1974, and 
at the time the 50 year charter period expired in 1977, LaVaun Terry actively 
served as an officer of Wilkinson. (R. at 207.) While the parties were not in 
agreement in their summary judgment briefing as to how many shares were 
owned by LaVaun Terry, the evidence was undisputed that in 1982, LaVaun 
Terry acquired shares in Wilkinson.2 (R. at 207, 210.) LaVaun Terry acquired 
these shares from S.C. Wilkinson. (R. at 207.) Upon her passing in 2002, 
1
 In his brief, Plaintiff makes no citations to the record in support of any of his Statement of 
Facts, notwithstanding the requirements of Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7). To the extent Plaintiff 
relies on facts not included in the record to support his appellate claims, the Statement of Facts 
should be stricken. 
2
 Ultimately, the only evidence supporting Plaintiff's contention was an affidavit stricken on 
hearsay grounds. 
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Plaintiff inherited one share in Wilkinson from LaVaun Terry, who was the 
Plaintiff's mother. (R. at 207.) 
In 2003, Plaintiff complained to the Division in an attempt to have 
Wilkinson's business shut down. On March 14, 2003, the Division responded by 
inviting Wilkinson to amend its Articles of Incorporation to reflect a perpetual 
duration. (R. at 022.) On April 7, 2003, in response to the Division's action, 
Plaintiff, through his counsel again objected to Wilkinson's continuing operation 
by correspondence to the Division's Director. (R. at 024-25.) On April 14, 2003, 
Wilkinson filed Amended and Restated Articles of Corporation to modify its 
existence to perpetual, consistent with the Division's invitation. By letter of April 
22, 2003, the Division advised Plaintiff that it had accepted and filed the 
amended articles. (R. at 185.) The Division has issued Wilkinson a Certificate 
of Existence, which reflects Wilkinson's good standing with the Division. (R. at 
212.) In response to the Division's action, Plaintiff took no steps to 
administratively appeal the Division's actions, either with the Division, or with the 
Department of Commerce. Plaintiff filed this suit on August 25, 2003, seeking 
declaratory relief. (R. at 001-03.) 
Summary of Arguments 
The trial court properly concluded that it was devoid of jurisdiction over 
Plaintiff's claims pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-14. Plaintiff failed to 
exhaust administrative remedies after the Division took conclusive action in 
inviting Defendant to renew and subsequently accepting Defendant's corporate 
charter. Having failed to exhaust, Plaintiff's action was barred. Alternatively, 
even if the trial court had jurisdiction to entertain Plaintiff's claims, it did not 
abuse its discretion in granting summary judgment to Defendant based on the 
doctrine of laches. 
Argument 
I. Plaintiff's Claims Are Barred Given His Failure To Exhaust 
Administrative Remedies. 
Plaintiffs claim for declaratory relief against Wilkinson cannot stand 
because Plaintiff failed to exhaust administrative remedies. The Legislature has 
empowered the Division to make conclusive determinations as to a 
corporation's status under Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-128. This statute further 
authorizes the Division to issue certificates of existence evidencing a 
corporation's status. Any such certificate "may be relied upon as conclusive 
evidence of the facts set forth in the certificate." Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-
128(3). 
A party disagreeing with a determination of the Division has administrative 
avenues of relief to pursue. Utah Admin. Code R151-46b-1, et seq. establishes 
administrative procedures for parties seeking action by the Department of 
Commerce or its sub-divisions. Utah Admin. Code R151-46b-12 specifically 
establishes procedures for parties who are dissatisfied with an order from the 
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agency. Likewise consistent with statutory requirements, Utah Admin. Code 
R151-46b-14 precludes judicial review of Department of Commerce action by a 
party who has not exhausted its administrative remedies. 
Under the Administrative Procedures Act, compliance with an agency's 
procedures for review is mandatory. Indeed, "A party may seek judicial review 
only after exhausting all administrative remedies available..." Utah Code Ann. § 
63-46b-14(2). This Court has stated, "The basic purpose underlying the 
doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies 'is to allow an administrative 
agency to perform functions within its special competence - to make a factual 
record, to apply its expertise, and to correct its own errors so as to moot judicial 
controversies.'" Maverik Countrv Stores. Inc. v. Industrial Comm'n of Utah. 860 
P.2d 944, 947 (Utah Ct. App. 1993)(Citations omitted.) Failure to comply with 
the Administrative Procedures Act's exhaustion requirement deprives a 
reviewing court of jurisdiction. ]d. at 947-48. See, also. Housing Authority of 
County of Salt Lake v. Snvder. 2002 UT 28,1f11, 44 P.3d 724 (Where 
exhaustion requirement is not satisfied, courts lack subject matter jurisdiction); 
Horn v. Utah Dep't of Public Safety. 962 P.2d 95, 99 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) 
(Where exhaustion requirement is not satisfied, courts lack subject matter 
jurisdiction); Career Serv. Review Bd. v. Utah Dep't. of Corrections. 942 P.2d 
933, 938-39 (Utah 1997)(res judicata and collateral estoppel apply to decisions 
of administrative agencies and bar relitigation of issues a party fails to appeal by 
way of judicial review). 
In the case subjudice, there is no question that the Division has authority 
to take administrative action in the case. Plaintiff acknowledges in his 
memorandum that "the Division has initial, conclusive authority to determine 
corporate status" and that "the Division also has exclusive authority to 
administratively dissolve a corporation..." (Br. of Appellant at 8.)3 
Notwithstanding this concession, Plaintiff then proceeds to ignore the 
exhaustion requirement, which deprived the district court of jurisdiction, and 
proceeds to a legal argument, which should have been raised and exhausted 
with the Department of Commerce. 
Plaintiff offers no suggestion that the exhaustion requirement does nox 
apply to the facts of this matter, nor does it argue that any of the statutory or 
judicially-created exceptions to the exhaustion requirement apply. Having made 
no attack on the fundamental basis for the trial court's grant of Wilkinson's 
motion for summary judgment, Plaintiff's arguments as to how the provisions of 
the Revised Business Corporations Act and caselaw should apply to the 
underlying facts of this case are irrelevant. The district court's conclusion that it 
lacked jurisdiction should be affirmed. 
3
 Perhaps for this reason, Plaintiff was especially careful to keep the Division out of the lawsuit. 
While it begrudgingly named the Division as a party after Wilkinson filed a Motion to Dismiss 
under Utah R. Civ. P. 12(b)(7), it dismissed the Division shortly thereafter. 
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II. Plaintiff's Claims Are Properly Dismissed Under the Doctrine of 
Laches. 
The trial court correctly granted summary judgment in Wilkinson's favor on 
the issue of laches. The doctrine of laches has two elements in Utah. A 
defendant must show that "(1) plaintiff unreasonably delayed in bringing an 
action, and (2) defendants were prejudiced by that delay." Nilson-Newev & Co. 
v. Utah Resources Int'L 905 P.2d 312, 314 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). 
In this case, in its motion for summary judgment, Wilkinson alleged the 
following facts relative to the doctrine of laches: (1) S. C. Wilkinson was an 
original incorporator and president of Wilkinson from its inception. (2) LaVaun 
Terry inherited 6 shares in the Defendant company from S.C. Wilkinson in 1982. 
(3) LaVaun Terry actively served as a corporate officer in Wilkinson beginning in 
1974. (4) Plaintiff inherited 1 share in Wilkinson from his mother in 2002. (5) 
Plaintiffs requested relief had the potential for far-reaching adverse tax 
consequences to the company. (Affidavit of Lorraine Burdett, Exhibit A, and R. at 
206-08.) (6) S.C. Wilkinson signed the articles of incorporation. (R. at 202.) 
(7) Wilkinson never ceased doing business but continued to file annual reports 
with the Division, which were accepted and never questioned. (R. at 185.) 
Plaintiff did not dispute the facts as required by Utah R. Civ. P. 7(c)(3)(B). 
To the contrary, Plaintiff's memorandum opposing summary judgment merely 
contained a brief paragraph disputing that LaVaun Terry had a predecessor in 
interest for her shares in Wilkinson.4 Plaintiff also filed an affidavit, which was 
stricken on hearsay grounds.5 Accordingly, there was no record evidence to 
controvert any of the facts relied upon by Wilkinson, and which served as the 
basis for the district court's finding of laches. 
On appeal, this Court should not disturb the trial court's finding of laches 
"unless it appears that a manifest injustice has been done, or the decision cannot 
reasonably be found to be supported by the evidence." Papanikolas Bros. 
Enterprises. 535 P.2d at 1260. Likewise, whether the doctrine of laches will 
apply can only be determined under the facts and circumstances of each unique 
case. See. Mawhinnev v. Jensen. 232 P.2d 769, 773 (Utah 1951). 
In the case at bar, Plaintiff has not argued the existence of a single fact to 
show that that the district court abused its discretion or was unsupported. 
Instead, it argues that two points relied upon by the district court, underlying its 
ultimate conclusion that there was unreasonable delay, are inconsistent. This is 
an insufficient basis to show an abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court. 
Plaintiffs reliance on Goodman v. Lee. 76 F.3d 1007 (5th Cir. 1996), is equally 
uncompelling given the case by case evaluation required in applying the doctrine 
of laches. Whereas in Goodman there was evidence that Plaintiffs were 
4
 In the undersigned's review of the Court record, it appears the Plaintiff's memorandum 
opposing summary judgment has also been stricken or is missing. As a general rule, the 
appellant bears the burden of ensuring a complete record. See, State v. Litherland. 2000 UT 
76,1J17, 12 P.3d 92. Nevertheless, for ease of reference, a copy of the memorandum is 
attached hereto as Exhibit B. 
5
 Plaintiff has not challenged the district court's decision to strike the Affidavit of Donald Terry in 
his memorandum. 
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unaware of their cause of action, the district court in this case found based on the 
evidence that the Plaintiffs predecessors knew or should have known of the facts 
underlying the cause of action, and therefore the delay in bringing these claims 
was unreasonable. (R. at 245.) This was amply supported by the summary 
judgment evidence, which established that Plaintiffs predecessors in interest 
either knew of the terms of the corporate charter (having signed it), or as officers 
in the corporation, should have known of the circumstances surrounding the 
corporate existence. 
Plaintiff appears to argue that the district court decision cannot be 
sustained solely because the district court concluded that Wilkinson believed it 
had some sort of "de facto" existence. However, Plaintiff, argues no evidence on 
appeal to undermine the district court's conclusion that Plaintiffs predecessors 
knew or should have known of the charter's expiration or that there was an 
unreasonable delay in taking action. Nor does Plaintiff challenge the district 
court's finding that Wilkinson was prejudiced by the delay. Absent a showing that 
these findings, as to the elements of laches, constituted an abuse of the district 
court's discretion, the district court's order should stand. Moreover, Plaintiff has 
not presented this Court with any legal basis on appeal, which merits overturning 
the district court's finding of laches. 
Conclusion 
This case centers in the complaints of the owner of a single shareholder in 
Wilkinson with a vendetta against the family-owned corporation. In Plaintiff's zeal 
to get a court determination shutting down the family business, Plaintiff deprived 
the Court of jurisdiction in failing to exhaust his administrative remedies with the 
Division and the Department of Commerce. In addition, Plaintiff has shown no 
legal basis to call into question the district court's alternative finding of laches. 
The district court was correct to grant summary judgment to Wilkinson on both of 
these issues. Wilkinson respectfully requests that the district court be affirmed. 
DATED this \°j day of March, 2007. 
STEVENSON & SMITH, P.C. 
By: 
H. Thomas Stevenson 
Benjamin C Rasmussen 
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR WEBER COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD E. TERRY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILKINSON FARM SERVICE 
COMPANY and UTAH STATE 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS & 
COMMERCIAL CODE, 
Defendants. 
WILKINSON FARM SERVICE 
COMPANY, j 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMERCE, DIVISION OF 
CORPORATIONS & COMMERCIAL 
CODE, 
Third Party Defendant. 
AFFIDAVIT OF LORRAINE BURDETT 
Civil No. 030906753 
Judge Michael D. Lyon 
1 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
ss. 
COUNTY OF WEBER ) 
COMES NOW Affiant, Lorraine Burdett, having been duly sworn, and deposes 
and states as follows: 
1. My name is Lorraine Burdett. I am over the age of 18 and competent to testify. I 
have personal knowledge of the facts set forth herein. 
2. I am the president of Wilkinson Farm Service Company. I have been a 
shareholder in the company since prior to the 1960's. 
3. My father S.C. Wilkinson, was an incorporator of Wilkinson Farm Service 
Company and its president from its inception in 1927. 
4. On November 30, 1982, LaVaun Terry received six shares in Wilkinson Farm 
Service Company inherited from S.C. Wilkinson. 
5. In addition, LaVaun has served as an officer in the corporation. Tax returns 
show that LaVaun was corporate vice president as early as 1974. 
6. In 2002, Plaintiff Donald Terry acquired 1 share in Wilkinson Farm Service 
Company by inheritance from LaVaun Terry. 
7. Any judicial declaration that the corporation has not existed since 1977 has the 
potential to impact the corporation's tax liability and require extensive 
amendments to corporate tax returns. 
Further Affiant sayeth not. 
I > S 7 ° CQ 2 "* •"" 
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DATED this day of December, 2005. 
y^Lcs^J*^ 
Lorraine Burdett 
Affiant 
SUBSCRIBED and SWORN this 
JULIE S WILLIAMS 
NOTARY PU8UC-SMTE0FUMH 
3986 WASHINGTON BO/0 
O G 0 E N , UT 8 4 4 0 3 
C0MM. EXP. 06-28-2007 
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MICHAEL F. OLMSTEAD [2455] 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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Telephone (801) 625-0960 
Facsimile (801)621-0035 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD E. TERRY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILKINSON FARM SERVICE COMPANY and 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS & 
COMMERCIAL CODE, 
Defendants. 
WILKINSON FARM SERVICE COMPANY, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS & 
COMMERCIAL CODE, 
PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM IN 
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT 
WILKINSON FARM SERVICE 
COMPANY'S CROSS MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND IN 
REPLY TO DEFENDANT WILKINSON 
FARM SERVICE COMPANY'S 
OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT AND JUDGMENT 
ON THE PLEADINGS 
Civil No. 030906753 
Third-Party Defendant. Judge MICHAEL D. LYON 
Plaintiffs Motion in Opposition to Defendant Wilkinson Farm Service Company's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
Reply to Defendant Wilkinson Farm Service Company's Opposition to Plaintiff Motion for Summary Judgment and Judgment on 
the Pleadings 
Civil No. 030906753 
INTRODUCTION 
Plaintiff has filed a Motion for Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings and 
submitted a Memorandum in Support thereof. Defendant WILKINSON FARM SERVICE 
COMPANY (hereinafter "Wilkinson") has filed a Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and 
submitted a Memorandum in Support of its Cross Motion and in Opposition to Plaintiffs initial 
Motion. This Memorandum addresses the points raised in Wilkinson's Cross Motion and 
Memorandum in Support thereof. 
FACTS IN DISPUTE 
Wilkinson, in its Memorandum in Support of its Cross Motion, recites facts (based on an 
Affidavit filed by Lorraine Burdett) indicating that the one (1) share of stock (ownership interest) 
inherited by Plaintiff was originally owned by S. C. Wilkinson. 
Plaintiffs position is that the share of stock inherited from his mother, LaVaun Terry in 2001 
was only one (1) of sixteen (16) shares she had received from the company in her own right. (See 
Affidavit of Donald E. Terry attached hereto as Exhibit "A" and, by this reference, made a part of 
this Memorandum.) In summary, Plaintiff claims the only predecessor-in-interest to his ownership 
interest in the company was his mother, LaVaun Terry. 
RESPONSE TO WILKINSON'S POINT I 
[STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS] 
Wilkinson argues that Plaintiff is bound by the failure of his predecessors-in-interest to 
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Plaintiffs Motion in Opposition to Defendant Wilkinson Farm Service Company's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
Reply to Defendant Wilkinson Farm Service Company's Opposition to Plaintiff Motion for Summary Judgment and Judgment on 
the Pleadings 
Civil No. 030906753 
challenge Wilkinson's corporate status after November 1977, when its charter expired. Wilkinson 
argues that, because Plaintiffs ancestors failed to challenge corporate status during the ensuing four 
(4) years, any claim became forever barred. 
Defendant's argument is based on the premise that, at the moment Wilkinson's charter 
expired, a cause of action accrued, and it was incumbent at that time on Plaintiffs predecessors to 
pursue an action similar to the one here taken by Plaintiff. The premise upon which this argument 
is based is flawed because, first, it fails to recognize that Plaintiff is not making a claim against 
Wilkinson but is simply seeking a judicial declaration of Wilkinson's corporate status, due to its 
expired charter. It also ignores the fact that if, as Plaintiff claims, Wilkinson's existence as a 
corporation ceased by operation of law after November 1977, then that status continues to the present 
day. Wilkinson's status, as an expired corporation, doesn't change by mere passage of time. The 
company's corporate existence cannot suddenly be resurrected after aperiod of four (4) years, simply 
because no one questions that status. Plaintiff, in fact, had no standing to raise the question and seek 
a declaration of status until he acquired his ownership interest through inheritance in 2001. 
A proper analogy would be a "continuing trespass". As long as the wrong continues, each 
new person affected by the wrong has a new cause of action. If Wilkinson ceased to be a corporation 
after November 1977, that status continues forever, and Plaintiff has a right to have a judicial 
declaration of that status at the moment he gains an ownership interest. 
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Plaintiffs Motion in Opposition to Defendant Wilkinson Farm Service Company's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment and in 
Reply to Defendant Wilkinson Farm Service Company's Opposition to Plaintiff Motion for Summary Judgment and Judgment on 
the Pleadings 
Civil No. 030906753 
Even assuming a statute-of-limitation analysis is applicable, the time does not begin to run 
until "a cause of action has accrued". [Utah Code Annotated. §78-12-1.] In certain situations, 
ignorance of the existence of cause of action will excuse inaction and prevent the running of the 
limitations' period. [Maughan vs. S. W. Servicing. Inc., 1985,758 Fed. 2d 1381.] Under Utah law, 
the statute of limitations is tolled until the Plaintiff knew, or, with due diligence, should have known, 
of his cause of action and in exceptional circumstances where the application of the general rule 
would be irrational or unjust. [Allen vs. U. S.. 1984, 588 F. Supp., 247, Reversed 1816 F. 2d 1417, 
Certiorari Denied, 108 S. Court, 694, 484 U. S. 1004, 98, Law Edition 2d 647.] 
There are three (3) situations in which the so-called discovery rule applies: (1) When the 
discovery rule is mandated by statute; (2) when a Plaintiff does not become aware of a cause of 
action because of Defendant's concealment or misleading conduct; and (3) when the case presents 
exceptional circumstances, and the application of the general rule would be irrational or unjust, 
regardless of any showing that the Defendant has prevented the discovery of the cause of action. 
[HOM vs. Utah Department of Public Safety, 1988,962 P.2d 95, 347 Utah Advanced Reports 15.] 
Plaintiff believes that an application of the discovery rule is proper in this case under, at least, 
two (2) of the three (3) situations described above. 
First, Plaintiff believes that the discovery rule is mandated by statute. Utah Code Annotated, 
§78-12-26(3), provides for a three (3) year statute of limitations "for relief on the ground of fraud 
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or mistake; except that the cause of action in such case does not accrue until the discovery by the 
agreed party of facts constituting fraud or mistake." 
Plaintiff is not claiming fraud on Defendant's part but does claim mutual mistake on behalf 
of both Plaintiff and Defendant Wilkinson as to the actual status of the company following 
November 1977. This mutual mistake was compounded by the action of the Utah Division of 
Corporations in requesting and accepting annual renewals for the company post-November 1977. 
Plaintiff promptly pursued this claim after he had discovered the mutual mistake that Wilkinson, its 
shareholders and the Division of Corporations had made for two and one-half decades. 
Plaintiff also believes that this case presents exceptional circumstances which require the 
application of the "discovery rule", as indicated by Plaintiffs Affidavit attached hereto. Plaintiffs 
mother had no working knowledge of company operations. She was assigned a title in name only. 
The day-to-day operations were conducted by S. C. Wilkinson and Lorraine Burdett, both before and 
after November 1977. LaVaun Terry had no reason to question corporate status, as apparently, as 
indicated above, there was no interruption of corporate existence according to state records and 
annual renewals continued. 
RESPONSE TO WILKINSON'S POINT II 
[DOCTRINE OF LACHES] 
Wilkinson's argument here is that, among other things, Plaintiff unreasonably delayed in 
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bringing this action. As indicated above, Plaintiffs only predecessor-in-interest was his mother, 
LaVaun Terry. As indicated in Plaintiffs Affidavit, his mother was an officer in name only and had 
no actual or direct knowledge of the day-to-day operations of the business and relied solely on 
information provided by S. C. Wilkinson and/or Lorraine Burdett for information concerning the 
corporation. As indicated in Point I, LaVaun Terry had no knowledge that there was any issue with 
regard to the company's corporate status and believed, as likely S. C. Wilkinson and Lorraine 
Burdett did, that the corporation was viable, in view of the action (or non action) of the Division of 
Corporations in the years following 1977. In summary, there was no "unreasonable delay" in 
bringing this action, because there was no discovery until after Mrs. Terry's death in 2001. 
RESPONSE TO WILKINSON'S POINT III 
[FAILURE TO EXHAUST ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES] 
Wilkinson argues that Plaintiff was required to seek administrative review of the Division's 
decision to accept belated amendments to Wilkinson's Articles of Incorporation requesting perpetual 
existence. This argument is based on the premise cited in Wilkinson's Memorandum, on page 5, 
that "The Legislature has empowered the Division to make conclusive determinations as to a 
corporation's status", citing present Utah Code Annotated, §16-10a-128. 
Plaintiff acknowledges that, under present Utah statutory law (in effect since 1992), the 
Division of Corporations has initial conclusive authority to determine corporate status. Plaintiff also 
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acknowledges that, under current statutory law, the Division also has exclusive authority to 
administratively dissolve a corporation for, among other things, "because its period of duration has 
expired". [Utah Code Annotated. §16-10a-1420(5).] 
Wilkinson's argument, under Point III, is based on a couple of false premises, namely: (1) 
That Wilkinson was a viable corporation in 2003 when the Division accepted its Amended Articles; 
and (2) that the Revised Business Corporation Act, enacted in 1992, applies in this case. On the 
contrary, Wilkinson was not a viable corporation in 2003, having suffered "corporate death" after 
November 1977 as a matter of law. In addition, the 1992 Revised Act is not the statutory law 
applicable in this case, and the Revised Act only applies to corporations "in existence" on July 1, 
1992. fSee Utah Code Annotated. §16-10a-1701.] Plaintiff would also note that the 1992 Revised 
Act has "savings provisions", saving the operation of prior statutes and rights affixed or accruing 
prior to the repeal of former statutes. In summary, this case must be decided by the law in effect in 
1977, not 1992. Administrative appeal of the action taken by the Division in 2003 is unnecessary, 
based on the statutory and case law in effect in 1977. 
RESPONSE TO WILKINSON'S POINT IV 
[DIVISION'S AUTHORITY TO REINSTATE BY ACCEPTING AMENDMENTS] 
In its final point, Wilkinson argues that there was a substantive right to reinstate in 2003, 
based on the 1972 statute, which allowed two (2) years following expiration for a corporation to file 
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amendments extending its duration and seeking reinstatement. 
Once again, Defendant compares "apples to oranges". Under the old statute, the Attorney 
General's office was required to initiate Court action in order to dissolve corporations that had failed 
to comply with administrative procedures or in cases where there were other violations resulting in 
"involuntary dissolution". [Utah Code Annotated, 16-10-89 (1972).] Absent from the former statute 
was language requiring a Court to pronounce "involuntary dissolution", based upon a corporation's 
charter having expired. This supports Plaintiffs argument that the older statute recognized that 
corporate status terminates as a matter of law by reason of expiration of charter, without the necessity 
of an Attorney General action and Court Order. 
Plaintiff would concede that, under the old statute, Wilkinson did apparently have a right, 
for two (2) years following its automatic dissolution, to seek reinstatement under the old Utah Code 
Annotated, §16-10-100. When it failed to do so within that prescribed time, its right to reinstatement 
was lost. 
SUMMARY 
AND CONCLUSION 
As set forth above, neither the statute of limitations or the doctrine of laches should preclude 
this action, because there was no discovery of the circumstances giving rise to the cause of action 
until after LaVaun Terry's death in 2001. This lack of discovery was predicated upon mutual 
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mistake, exacerbated by the actions of the Division of Corporations. Administrative appeal is not 
required, and Wilkinson's rights of reinstatement was lost after two (2) years following the 
expiration of its charter. Defendant's Cross Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied, and 
the Court should grant Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this $ day of February, 2006. 
MICttAEL F. OLMSTEAD 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Plaintiffs 
Motion in Opposition to Defendant Wilkinson Farm Service Company's Cross Motion for Summary 
Judgment and in Reply to Defendant Wilkinson Farm Service Company's Opposition to Plaintiff's 
Motion for Summary Judgment and Judgment on the Pleadings to H. THOMAS STEVENSON, 
Attorney for Defendant, WILKM^ON FARM SERVICE COMPANY, 3986 Washington Boulevard, 
Ogden, Utah, 84403, this / / ^ V d a v of February, 2006. 
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EXHIBIT "A" 
MICHAEL P. OLMSTBAD £2455] 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
2650 Washington Boulevard, Suite 102 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
Telephone (801) 625-0960 
Facsimile (801)621-0035 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF WEBER COUNTY 
OGDEN DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH 
DONALD E. TERRY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WILKINSON FARM SERVICE COMPANY and 
UTAH STATB DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS & 
COMMERCIAL CODE, 
Defendants. 
AFFIDAVIT OF DONALD E. TERRY 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
AND IN OPPOSITION 
TO CROSS-MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY 
JUDGMENT 
WILKINSON FARM SERVICE COMPANY, 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE, 
DIVISION OF CORPORATIONS & 
COMMERCIAL CODE, 
Civil No. 030906753 
Third-Party Defendant. Judge MICHAEL D. LYON 
r-KUivi Mil ANY KEY INC 858 673 1538 
Affidavit of Donald Ex Teny in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Cross-Motion for 
Summazy Judgment 
Civil No. 030906753 
STATE OF CALIFORNIA ) 
)$$. 
COUNTYOF .) 
DONALD E, TERRY, upon oath, deposes and says: 
L I am the Plaintiff above-named, and I am familiar with the facts and circumstances 
stated herein. 
2. My only predecessor-in-interest to the ownership interest in question was my mother, 
LaVaun W. Teny. Mrs. Teny became deceased on May 26,2001. 
3. At the time of her death, LaVaun W. Terry owned two (2) of approximately forty 
(40) shares of stock that had been issued by Wilkinson Farm Service Corporation. Affiant inherited 
one (1) of those two (2) shares as a result of his mother's death, the other share being distributed to 
Affiant's sister. 
4. LaVaun W. Terry did not inherit stock from S. C. Wilkinson but instead, had owned, 
at one time, sixteen (16) shares in Wilkinson in her own right. She had transferred fourteen (14) of 
those sixteen (16) shares back to the corporation and/or Lorraine Burdett in the late 1970s and early 
1980s. (See letter from Lorraine Burdett to Affiant, dated June 12,2001, referencing the purchase 
of LaVaun W. Terry's stock.) 
5. Though she owned a substantial interest in Wilkinson* LaVaun W> Terry, during her 
lifetime, was not actively engaged in the day-to-day business, as an officer or director, and relied, 
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instead, on information provided by its president, Samuel C. Wilkinson (LaVaun W. Terry's father), 
and its long-time secretary, Lorraine Buxdett (LaVaun W. Terry's sister), who then became 
Wilkinson's president, after Samuel C. Wilkinson's death in 1981. 
6. My mother, LaVaun W. Terry, was a corporate officer, in name only, and repeatedly 
complained to me over a period of forty (40) years about not being privy to the workings of the 
corporation. To my knowledge, there were no actual annual meetings of shareholders, officers and 
directors, where my mother participated in discussing the business of the corporation, including its 
corporate status, 
7, My mother, during her lifetime, understood and believed that Wilkinson was a lawful 
corporation. 
Further, Affiant sqyeth naught 
DATED and signed this \ ^^dav of December, 2005. 
DONALD E.TCR^^^ntiff 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /^JAsiy of December, 2005. 
m ii_m • P ^ ^ A 
ETSUKOEICHER _ 
Commission # 152D841 I ^R5TARY PUBLIC 
Notary Public - California | 
San Diego County I 
My Comm. Expires Oct 21 > 2008f 
